Türkiye’s 2053 Net-Zero Commitment in Global Context

Introduction

From the horrendous wildfires along the Aegean Coasts to water shortages in Central Anatolia, the fingerprints of climate change are already visible all across Türkiye, including its economy and daily life. Such mounting pressure makes the climate issue a more pivotal concept for Türkiye.

Türkiye has set an ambitious target to hit net-zero emissions by 2053, keeping in step with climate efforts at an international level. Introduced in 2021 in conjunction with ratification of the Paris Agreement, the 2053 target will necessitate wide-ranging alterations in the economy. Reaching "net zero" involves offsetting any residual emissions with removals (such as forests or technology) to such an extent that net emissions fall to zero. This mid-century deadline is aligned with scientific consensus that preventing more than 1.5 °C warming requires carbon neutrality by mid-century. As an emerging country and G20 nation, Türkiye's transition will bring challenges: such as reusing old energy systems and sectors, as well as opportunities, such as less dependence on imported fossil fuels, and green economic development.

Aligning with its global aspirations, Türkiye's 2053 net-zero commitment puts it in the ranks of numerous other countries that have adopted mid-century targets for carbon neutrality. The majority of European Union nations, for instance, adopt 2050, followed by 2060 for China and 2070 for India. Türkiye's target date "2053" is emphatically related to domestic achievements, but in fact, represents adherence to the global timescale in the Paris Agreement to contain climate change. After years of reluctance, Türkiye became a party to the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and presented its updated First Nationally Determined Contribution in 2023.

Under the revised NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions), the nation pledged to decrease emissions 41% below normal by 2030 (approximately 695 MtCO₂e in 2030) and peak emissions by 2038. This implies that emissions could keep on rising until 2038, then decline dramatically to reach net-zero in 2053, an extremely tight timeline.

Upon a comparative perspective, as a mid-level emitter with about 1% of world emissions, but with per-capita emissions on an upward trend as it grows economically, achieving net-zero in 2053 would support world targets and is particularly important in being part of continued efforts to limit warming to well below 2 °C. This is also aligned with Türkiye's main trade partners' climate ambitions (particularly the EU) to avoid trade losses. The net-zero target in Türkiye is, however, noted by international analysts as not having solid near-term action outlined in it at present and being rated "poor" in terms of strength in the absence of stronger mid-term targets.

Policy Developments and International Context

Early Policy Milestones (2021 – 2023)

Türkiye has taken concrete steps in climate policy since 2021, such as ratifying the Paris Agreement, committing to the 2053 target, issuing the 2010 – 2023 National Strategy on Climate Change, the 2011 – 2023 National Climate Change Action Plan, and the Green Deal Action Plan. However, all of these efforts are not legally binding due to the absence of an enforcement mechanism.

“2053” Strategy Announcement (COP29, 2024)

In 2024, Türkiye announced its “2053 Long-Term Climate Change Strategy” at COP29, which was held in Baku on 11 – 22 November¹ and later published by UNFCCC. The strategy² includes a section on “Preparation Process of the Long-Term Climate Strategy” that underlines efforts and measures. Among these, the ‘Climate Law’ stands out in particular, as it was being drafted when the strategy was announced to incorporate international agreements ratified by Türkiye into domestic legislation and to pave the way for the establishment of a legal framework for climate-change action³. The law aims to support Türkiye’s green growth, establish a legal framework for combating climate change, and achieve its 2053 net-zero emission target. The law is crucial for providing a legal ground for the reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions, planning and implementation tools, and an institutional framework⁴. The 2053 Long-Term Climate Change Strategy is crucial as a strategic roadmap with the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s 2053 net-zero emissions target.

Draft Climate Law and Legislative Journey

However, after the draft law was approved by the Environment Committee and presented to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye—where it was expected to become law in the General Assembly—Türkiye’s first “Climate Law Proposal” was withdrawn after strong criticism from opposition parties and environmental groups. The draft law is an important step in Türkiye’s fight against climate change as it includes various planning and implementation tools to concretize the 2053 Net-Zero Emissions Target and the goals outlined in Türkiye’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) within the framework of international agreements to which Türkiye is a party. If enacted, the law would have established the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), an Emissions Trading System (ETS), introduced carbon pricing, and imposed new obligations on businesses. However, the draft law also contains several shortcomings that reveal a lack of inclusiveness, commitment, and clarity in drafting and implementing carbon-reduction policies.

Key Shortcomings Highlighted by Stakeholders

First, the draft law does not include a policy or an absolute emissions-reduction target regarding when and how Türkiye will reduce its carbon emissions. Instead, it envisions that Türkiye’s NDC will be updated at specific intervals and submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat⁵. While Türkiye has set an ambitious target to hit net-zero emissions by 2053, the proposed law lacks well-defined targets to achieve carbon neutrality by that year⁶. In this context, the fact that the 2053 net-zero target is mentioned only in the rationale and that there is no provision for it in the actual text of the law raises concerns about its enforceability. Second, despite emphasizing the role of public institutions in incorporating climate targets into their decision-making processes, a concrete mechanism for its application is missing⁷. The lack of an enforcement mechanism for responsibilities among relevant public institutions and authorities raises doubts about policy implementation toward reaching net-zero emissions by 2053.

Public Engagement and Just-Transition Concerns

More importantly, during the preparation of the draft law, there was insufficient communication with environmental and ecological associations, civil-society organizations, and experts whose input was overlooked. For a transparent, inclusive, and accountable implementation process, it is crucial to engage NGOs, professionals, and the scientific community. Finally, other criticisms of the proposal included concerns that concepts such as climate justice were being diluted. In other words, the just-transition concept remained merely at the level of discourse, with no concrete implementation mechanisms specified. This is crucial because a just transition is an important enabler for implementing the net-zero transition: including all affected parties and addressing injustices helps ensure political acceptability for climate action, ease the risk of just-transition litigation, and avoid delays in reaching the net-zero target⁸.

Paris Agreement Summit

Broader Geopolitical Headwinds

Another factor to consider for Türkiye’s 2053 Net-Zero Commitment is the range of geopolitical risks. In his second presidency, Donald Trump’s executive actions on climate and environment included withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, declaring a “national energy emergency” to double down on oil and gas, and eliminating a push for environmental justice—actions that will have severe implications for global climate action⁹. As a major geopolitical player and top emitter, the U.S. significantly influences global climate dynamics¹⁰. Trump’s anti-climate policies are also wearing down fragile support for net-zero targets and enhancing the opportunism of policy-makers sceptical of climate-change mitigation efforts¹¹. Furthermore, as the EU faces backlash over climate regulations and deals with the war in Ukraine, the bloc is shifting its spending priorities from greening the economy to investing in defence¹². Türkiye, already navigating a complex balancing act between domestic energy needs and climate ambitions, may face reduced international pressure or incentive to accelerate its transition.

Barriers, Risks, and Opportunities

In addition to international scepticism surrounding the project's feasibility within the proposed timeframe, conflicting policy objectives may hinder the Turkish administration’s willingness to accelerate its efforts on renewable development.

A key obstacle to full commitment towards net zero is the trade-off between economic growth and emissions reduction. Economic growth remains a top priority in Türkiye, as reflected in President Erdoğan’s ambition to transform the country from a “regional economic centre” into a “global economic powerhouse.” Historically, there has been a strong positive correlation between economic growth and energy consumption. Fundamentally, energy facilitates economic development and the production process by complementing capital and labour inputs. Therefore, if growth is to be pursued, energy demand will likely continue to rise steadily in the foreseeable future.

The implications for emissions are largely reflected in the outlook for domestic energy production. Türkiye’s ongoing reliance on coal has previously raised concerns, especially after it overtook Germany in 2024 as the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe. However, significant coal projects have recently been cancelled as the state shows increasing support for renewable alternatives—an encouraging signal of a potential decline in coal dependence. A continued coal phase-out would be a major milestone in decarbonisation, given coal's severe health and environmental impacts. However, this must not come at the expense of economic growth, energy affordability, or energy independence. As a short-term measure, the Turkish government may promote less polluting fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas, while building a broader transition to renewable sources. In line with this strategy, Türkiye has invested heavily in oil and gas exploration, with 270 drilling operations planned for 2025. While this approach does risk entrenching a more carbon-intensive energy future, it would nonetheless mark a notable improvement over the current status quo. Through this strategy, Türkiye aims to strike a balance between economic growth and emissions reduction.

There is further cause for optimism as renewable energy costs continue to fall a trend expected to persist. Türkiye’s geography and climate are well-suited for solar and wind energy, offering a promising path to cost-effective and sustainable energy independence. Large-scale implementation is expected once the cost structures and reliability of renewables justify mass adoption. Continued investment in energy efficiency is also anticipated, as it serves the interests of both the public and private sectors. Thus, a future in which growth and emissions are no longer mutually exclusive but instead become complementary, with numerous positive spillover effects, appears increasingly achievable.

Another crucial factor in renewable energy development is investment and capital, which are essential for building the necessary infrastructure. As a developing economy, Türkiye relies on a mix of domestic investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance large-scale renewable energy projects, such as offshore wind farms. The Twelfth Development Plan (2024–2028) outlined a strategy to increase Türkiye’s share of global FDI to 1.5% and regional FDI to 12% by 2028. However, actual figures have fallen short of potential: FDI was estimated at $10.6 billion in 2024, missing the earlier projection of $14 billion. Nevertheless, a positive trend is emerging. Policymakers have implemented disciplined monetary and fiscal measures in a successful effort to tame persistent inflation. Year-on-year inflation fell to 44% by the end of 2024 and is expected to decline below 30% in 2025. Capital inflows have also recovered, with strong demand for recent bond issues and subsequent declines in yields. All three major credit rating agencies have acknowledged these improvements, upgrading Türkiye’s sovereign credit rating twice in 2024. These upgrades signal a reduced perception of risk and instability, increasing confidence among foreign lenders and investors. Although this remains a multi-year effort, Türkiye is on track to realise its FDI potential—provided it continues to restore trust and credibility in its economy.

A new strategy proposed by the Republic Investment Office of Türkiye prioritises experimentation with renewable infrastructure and technological initiatives in underdeveloped regions. This aims to attract meaningful contributions toward Türkiye’s sustainable development goals. The country also hopes to deepen its integration into global supply chains through continued green transformation, digitisation, and the growth of high-value services. This will not only enhance Türkiye’s global competitiveness but also strengthen its commitment to renewable innovation, improving the plausibility of achieving net zero by 2053.

Türkiye has notably kept pace with the global electric vehicle (EV) trend—one of the fastest-growing sectors of its economy. EV sales are projected to account for 30% of all automobile sales by the end of the year, driven in part by domestic automaker TOGG, which has sold over 50,000 vehicles. Additionally, Chinese EV manufacturer BYD has pledged to build a $1 billion plant in Türkiye, demonstrating international recognition of Türkiye’s renewable growth strategy. The Turkish government has matched this momentum, planning to invest over $100 billion by 2035 to expand renewable capacity and modernise energy infrastructure. This serves as further testimony to Türkiye’s dedication to achieving its net-zero target while ensuring energy security and economic growth.

Transforming Key Sectors for Net‑Zero

1. Energy

Current status. The energy sector is Türkiye’s single largest greenhouse‑gas source, generating 73.8 % of national emissions in 2023 (≈ 442 Mt CO₂‑eq). Electricity production is still dominated by fossil fuels, so—even with steady growth in renewables—carbon intensity remains high.

Transition levers:

Rapidly scale solar and on‑shore/off‑shore wind capacity.

Boost system‑wide energy‑efficiency investments.

Cut technical and commercial grid losses.

Deploy carbon‑capture and storage (CCS) where renewables cannot yet displace fossil assets

Opportunities:

Local clean power reduces import dependence, lowers foreign‑exchange outflows, stimulates green‑tech jobs, and improves long‑term energy security.

2. Transportation

Current status. Transport‑related CO₂ sits within the energy inventory; road vehicles are the principal source.

Transition levers:

Accelerate electric‑vehicle (EV) rollout with charging‑network expansion.

Shift freight from road to rail and coastal shipping.

Tighten efficiency standards for conventional vehicles and promote biofuels / e‑fuels where electrification is difficult.

Opportunities: Cleaner mobility cuts urban air pollution, opens manufacturing niches for domestic EV producers, and slashes oil‑import bills.

3. Industry

Current status. Heavy industry emitted ≈ 70.7 Mt CO₂ in 2023 (11.8 % of total). Steel, cement, and other energy‑intensive subsectors dominate that footprint.

Transition levers:

Upgrade to best‑available, low‑carbon process technologies.

Electrify heat wherever feasible and integrate green hydrogen for high‑temperature processes.

Expand circular‑economy measures—higher recycling rates and industrial‑symbiosis clusters.

Require firm‑level carbon‑footprint disclosure and tie finance to decarbonisation plans.

Opportunities: Efficiency gains cut operating costs, green products gain export‑market access, and new investment flows toward low‑carbon manufacturing.

4. Buildings

Current status. Buildings consume roughly 30 % of Türkiye’s energy; much of the existing stock has poor insulation and outdated systems.

Transition levers:

Mandate high‑performance envelopes and heat‑pump/HVAC standards for all new construction.

Launch nationwide retrofit programmes for older housing, with fiscal incentives.

Roll out smart‑metering and building‑management systems.

Promote green‑building certification (e.g., YeS‑TR) and district heating/cooling where density allows.

Opportunities: Deep efficiency retrofits lower household energy bills, create skilled construction jobs, and make cities more resilient to climate extremes.

5. Agriculture

Current status. Agriculture accounted for 12 % of 2023 emissions (≈ 71.9 Mt CO₂‑eq), driven mainly by livestock methane, synthetic‑fertiliser N₂O, and land‑use practices.

Transition levers:

Deploy anaerobic digesters and improved feed additives to cut enteric methane.

Raise fertiliser‑use efficiency; adopt precision‑ag and organic alternatives.

Convert agricultural residues to biogas/biomass energy.

Provide farmer training and carbon‑smart extension services.

Opportunities: Lower input costs, new revenue from bioenergy, healthier soils, and alignment with emerging low‑carbon food‑export standards.

Türkiye’s Green Economy and Green Technology Transformation

In the contemporary world, the net-zero carbon ambitions of countries in the global fight against the climate crisis call for a shift in green technology and innovation. The Republic of Türkiye's 2053 net-zero carbon ambition is not only an environmental commitment, but a comprehensive overhaul of technological infrastructure and industrial ecosystem. Here, it is pertinent to discuss the role of paradigmatic changes in green technology and innovation in the shift of our country towards a carbon-neutral economy.

Renewable Energy: Solar and Wind Power Dominance

On the path to Türkiye's 2053 net-zero target, solar and wind energy are projected to reach a dominant position among renewable energy sources. According to data from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, as of 2023, 19.2% of Türkiye's total electricity production is supplied by wind and solar energy, with this ratio targeted to exceed 65% by 2053. Compared to traditional energy production methods, the cost-effectiveness of solar and wind energy and their radical reduction in carbon emissions highlight these two resources. Large-scale solar power plants established in regions with high solar radiation such as Konya, Karaman, and Karapınar, and wind turbines along the Aegean and Marmara coasts hold strategic importance for Türkiye's energy independence.

However, it should be emphasized that the increase in production capacity of solar and wind energy necessitates the modernization of the interconnected grid. According to projections by TEİAŞ (Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation), the required investment in grid infrastructure until 2053 exceeds $50 billion. The intermittent production characteristic inherent to renewable energy sources brings complex problems in grid management. Therefore, the integration of smart grid systems and storage technologies will play a critical role in achieving the 2053 target.

Hydropower and Geothermal Integration: Modernization Opportunities

Hydropower and geothermal resources have historically dominated Türkiye's energy mix. As per TÜBİTAK MAM's "Turkey Renewable Energy Potential Report" released in 2023, Türkiye's technically feasible hydroelectric potential is around 160 TWh/year, out of which approximately 70% is today utilized. However, as part of efforts to achieve the 2053 net-zero, modernization of these two sources of energy is inevitable. The use of digital twin technologies for hydroelectric power plant efficiency optimization and turbine optimizations, novel drilling technology and general acceptance of binary cycle systems for geothermal power, will have basic roles in optimizing the utilization of these resources.

In this connection, as per the 2022 "Turkey Geothermal Potential and Future" report issued by JESDER (Geothermal Power Plant Investors Association), at present, only 1.7 GW of Türkiye's 4.5 GW geothermal potential has been utilized. Usage of geothermal resources of Western Anatolia even for electricity generation and district heating and cooling options by means of integrated systems holds serious implications for enhancing energy efficiency.

Energy Storage and Battery Technologies

Energy storage systems are one of the most critical technologies in achieving the 2053 net-zero vision. Specifically lithium-ion battery production and increasing the storage capacity are key to the feasibility of renewable energy. Through the application of TÜBİTAK Marmara Research Center-coordinated BATARYATÜRK project, Turkish domestic battery manufacturing capacity should be 60 GWh by 2030. By doing so, Türkiye will achieve a crucial infrastructural requirement, not just in the energy sector, but also in developing an electric vehicle value chain.

The second-life battery concept pertains to the recycling of batteries that have expired their life of operation in electric vehicles for the use in stationary energy storage systems. According to the "Energy Storage Systems Roadmap" report published by EPDK (Energy Market Regulatory Authority) in 2024, it is feasible for 20 GWh of second-life batteries through 2040. Utilizing this opportunity in accordance with the ideas of circular economy will contribute towards decreasing the carbon footprint.

Hydrogen and Power-to-X Technologies

Green hydrogen will be a strategic element for Türkiye to achieve its net-zero target. The total hydrogen production capacity is set to be increased to 8 million tons by 2053, with at least 80% of it being green hydrogen, as stated in the "Turkey National Hydrogen Strategy" published by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources in 2022. Technological advances in electrolyzers to decrease the cost of green hydrogen and the benefits resulting from economies of scale will be critical factors in reaching this objective.

Industrial decarbonization based on hydrogen is very promising, especially in the steel, cement, and chemical industries. According to TÜSİAD's (Turkish Industry and Business Association) "Decarbonization Roadmap in Turkish Industry" report dated 2023, the use of hydrogen technologies has to be brought into practice in order to reduce the total emissions of these three sectors by up to 60%. Green hydrogen as a fuel source replacement for fossil fuels will have a revolutionary effect in industrial process decarbonization.

Electric Vehicles and Battery Ecosystem

The utilization of electric vehicles in mass numbers is unavoidable for reducing carbon in transportation. Following the launch of Türkiye's domestic-made automobile brand TOGG, concerns regarding domestic manufacture of batteries and charging stations became even more necessary. Türkiye has 8,500 charging points as of 2024, and this is expected to increase to 100,000 by 2030 and to 500,000 by 2053, based on Ministry of Industry and Technology figures.

Foreign electric vehicle manufacturers like BYD's intentions to establish production facilities in Türkiye and the electric vehicle transformation of the domestic motor industry make localization more important in battery technologies. In line with the "Automotive Supply Industry Electrification Roadmap" given by TAYSAD (Automotive Suppliers Association of Turkey), 60% of automotive supply companies will be required to transform their activities to producing electric vehicle components by 2030. It will bring great opportunities in terms of employment and technology transfer.

Carbon Capture and Utilization (CCU) Technologies

Carbon capture and utilization technologies are quite important for emission reduction, especially in the short and medium term. According to TÜBİTAK MAM Energy Institute research, the carbon capture potential of Türkiye is 120 million tons of CO2 equivalent annually. To take advantage of this potential, artificial photosynthesis, carbonation, and synthetic fuel production technologies need to be developed.

Decreasing the cost of carbon capture technologies and making them more scalable are the greatest challenges in this area. It is targeted in TÜBİTAK's 2024-2030 R&D Roadmap to decrease the cost of carbon capture technologies per ton by 50% by 2030. Reaching this goal will be a significant step in achieving the net-zero carbon goal.

R&D Ecosystem and Institutional Transformation

Türkiye needs a strong R&D environment to fulfill its 2053 net-zero ambition. TÜBİTAK established in 2022 the "Net Zero Research Institute," a flagship institution that performs coordinated research on green technologies. Energy storage, hydrogen production, and carbon capture technologies are some of the research topics identified by the institute for the years 2023-2028.

Raising the R&D spending of the private sector is also required at this stage. The ratio of Turkish companies' green technology R&D spendings to GDP is 0.25%, and it is targeted to increase this ratio to 1% by the year 2030, according to TÜSİAD's "Green Transformation and Business World" report published in 2024. Both for the promotion of technological innovation and for the increase in the amount of green jobs, this increase is vitally significant.

Conclusion

Green technology and innovations will play the central role in Türkiye's pathway to achieving its 2053 net-zero ambition. Renewable resources optimization, an increase in the capacity of energy storage, the production of green hydrogen, electric vehicle ecosystem building, and en masse use of carbon capture solutions are the key areas of interest in the success of this process.

For the sake of ensuring this technology revolution, institutional framework and policy programs should also be reshaped. R&D activities to be carried out under TÜBİTAK coordination and enhancing the capacity of the private sector for innovation will lead Türkiye to the forefront of global power in green technology.

The realization of the net-zero goal requires a technological transformation, and a social and economic transformation. For this purpose, policymakers, academics, entrepreneurs, and civil society actors should collaborate under a common vision towards the building of a sustainable world.

References

1. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. (2023). Turkey Energy Outlook 2023. (https://enerji.gov.tr/bilgi-merkezi-enerji-istatistik-rapor-gosterge)

2. TEİAŞ. (2023). Turkey Electricity System 2053 Projection Report. (https://www.teias.gov.tr/tr-TR/yayinlar-raporlar)

3. TÜBİTAK MAM. (2023). Turkey Renewable Energy Potential Report. (https://mam.tubitak.gov.tr/tr/yayinlar)

4. JESDER. (2022). Turkey Geothermal Potential and Future. (https://www.jesder.org/raporlar)

5. EPDK. (2024). Energy Storage Systems Roadmap. (https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-143/raporlar)

6. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. (2022). Turkey National Hydrogen Strategy. (https://enerji.gov.tr/bilgi-merkezi-stratejik-planlar)

7. TÜSİAD. (2023). Decarbonization Roadmap in Turkish Industry. ()

8. Ministry of Industry and Technology. (2024). Electric Vehicles and Charging Infrastructure Statistics. (https://www.sanayi.gov.tr/istatistikler)

9. TAYSAD. (2023). Automotive Supply Industry Electrification Roadmap. (https://www.taysad.org.tr/tr/raporlar)

10. TÜBİTAK. (2024). 2024-2030 R&D Roadmap. ()

11. TÜSİAD. (2024). Green Transformation and Business World. (https://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar)

¹ Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, “Türkiye’s 2053 Long-Term Climate Change Strategy to Be Announced at COP29,” accessed 7 May 2025.

² Republic of Türkiye, Türkiye Long-Term Climate Strategy, 11 November 2024.

⁵ Sinan Ülgen and Alina İltutmuş, Türkiye’nin İlk İklim Kanunu, EDAM, March 2025, p. 6.

⁶ Sabancı University Istanbul Policy Center, Public Policy and Cultural Narratives in a Global Europe, 29 March 2024, p. 3.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See relevant U.S. executive orders, 2025.

¹⁰ Global Climate Policy Institute, Geopolitics of Net-Zero, 2025.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² European Commission, “Budget Re-Prioritisation Brief,” 2025.