Religious Politics in Secular Türkiye: The Influence of Islam on Governance and Society
- Doruk Ünal
- May 1
- 16 min read
I do not affiliate myself with any political parties or beliefs, and this analysis is presented as an objective examination of Turkey's religious-political landscape. All sources have been thoroughly documented at the end of this article to ensure transparency and factual accuracy. The sources that I have utilized are mostly prestigious institutions however some may lack trust or controversy, I apologize for that.
To Begin..
Turkey stands as a unique case study in the complex relationship between religion and politics in the modern world. Officially secular since the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey has nevertheless experienced an ongoing negotiation between secular governance and Islamic identity that continues to shape its political landscape. This tension reflects broader questions facing many societies: How does a nation balance religious heritage with modern governance? Can democracy accommodate both secular principles and religious values? What happens when these forces compete for influence over state institutions and social norms?
As Atatürk himself (according to Grace Ellison with an interview with him in 1927) declared, “I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea… Superstition must go. Let them worship as they will; every man can follow his own conscience.” This foundational stance contrasts sharply with President Erdoğan’s modern vision of creating a “pious generation” that will “work for the construction of a new civilization.” Between these two positions lies the story of modern Turkey.
This article examines the historical evolution of Turkey’s relationship with Islam in the political sphere, from the late Ottoman period through the founding of the secular republic, the multi-party era, the rise of political Islam, and finally the transformation under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. By understanding this trajectory, we can better comprehend the unique character of Turkish secularism, the resurgence of Islamic politics, and the implications for Turkey’s future.
Part I: The Ottoman Legacy and the Birth of Turkish Secularism (1839-1923)
The Late Ottoman Period: Seeds of Secularization
Long before the Republic of Turkey was established, the Ottoman Empire had begun a gradual process of secularization through the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876). These reforms, aimed at modernizing the empire and countering European powers’ growing influence, introduced significant changes:
The establishment of secular schools alongside traditional religious education
Legal reforms including the introduction of commercial and penal codes based on European models
The creation of new judicial institutions that limited the scope of Islamic courts
Administrative reforms that diminished the ulema’s (religious scholars) traditional authority
The reforms represented the Ottoman state’s attempt to adapt to a changing world while preserving its Islamic character. During this period, three main intellectual currents emerged that would influence Turkey’s future relationship with religion:
Islamists who sought to revitalize Islamic institutions while selectively borrowing Western technology
Westernists who advocated for comprehensive adoption of European models including secularism
Turkish nationalists who aimed to forge a distinctly Turkish identity, often with secular leanings
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the subsequent Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government further advanced secularization efforts, bringing religious institutions under greater state control and promoting nationalist ideologies over pan-Islamic unity.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Radical Secularization
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the subsequent War of Independence (1919-1923) created the conditions for a more radical break with the Islamic past. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the republic’s founder and first president, implemented sweeping reforms that fundamentally altered the relationship between religion and state:
Abolition of the Caliphate (1924): Ended the symbolic leadership of the Muslim world that had been held by Ottoman sultans
Dissolution of religious orders (1925): Banned Sufi brotherhoods and closed their facilities
Adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (1926): Replaced Islamic family law with secular legal codes
Constitutional secularism (1928/1937): Removed Islam as the state religion and formally established laicism as a constitutional principle
Educational reforms: Unified education under state control, eliminated religious schools, and adopted the Latin alphabet
Cultural reforms: Banned traditional religious garb in public offices, introduced Western calendar and time systems, and changed the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday
Atatürk’s views on religion were blunt and uncompromising. He famously declared, “I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea… Superstition must go. Let them worship as they will; every man can follow his own conscience.” He maintained that religion was “between an individual and God” and warned against political exploitation of faith, quipping that evil people were those who “use religion for their own benefit.”
In practice, Atatürk’s regime adopted a strict, French-style secularism (laïcité): the state actively intervened to “secularize society by imposing a way of life that had no visible trace of traditional religion,” as later scholars have noted. The Turkish model of secularism, known as laiklik (derived from the French laïcité), differed significantly from Anglo-American secularism. Rather than creating a separation that allowed religious freedom, Turkish secularism involved state control over religious expression and institutions. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was established to regulate and supervise religious activities, effectively bringing Islam under state authority.
Part II: Contested Secularism in the Multi-Party Era (1950-1980)
Democratic Party and the First Religious Revival
The transition to multi-party democracy in 1946 and the Democratic Party’s electoral victory in 1950 marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkey’s religious politics. The Democratic Party (DP), under Adnan Menderes, did not openly challenge Kemalist secularism but adopted a more accommodating approach to religious sentiment:
Reintroduced Arabic call to prayer (previously banned)
Expanded religious education in schools
Increased funding for mosque construction
Relaxed restrictions on religious publications and organizations
These policies reflected both electoral calculations and a genuine belief that Atatürk’s radical secularism had gone too far in suppressing Turkey’s religious identity. However, the DP’s decade in power ended with the 1960 military coup, conducted partly in the name of protecting secularism.
The Rise of Explicitly Islamic Political Movements
The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of explicitly Islamic political parties, beginning with the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) founded in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. After its closure by the constitutional court, Erbakan established the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) in 1972.
Erbakan’s “National Outlook” (Milli Görüş) ideology combined: - Islamic moral values and identity - Economic development and industrialization - Anti-Western and anti-Zionist positions - Emphasis on Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage
The National Salvation Party participated in several coalition governments in the 1970s, giving Islamists their first experience in governance. This period also saw the growth of Islamic civil society organizations, religious publications, and business networks that would later provide the foundation for political Islam’s expansion.
Military Intervention and the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”
The 1980 military coup, while ostensibly defending secularism, paradoxically facilitated a greater role for Islam in public life. The military junta promoted the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as an ideological bulwark against leftist movements:
Introduced compulsory religious education in schools
Increased the budget and authority of the Directorate of Religious Affairs
Supported the expansion of Imam Hatip religious schools
Allowed greater religious content in state media
This pragmatic accommodation of religion reflected the military’s view that “controlled religion” could serve as a unifying force and counter to radical ideologies. However, it also created space for the further development of Islamic political and social movements.
Part III: The Political Islam Movement and its Transformation (1980-2002)
Erbakan’s Welfare Party and the “Just Order”
The 1980s economic liberalization under Turgut Özal’s leadership coincided with the growing strength of an Islamic-oriented business class and civil society. These developments created favorable conditions for the rise of Erbakan’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), established in 1983.
The Welfare Party expanded its support base through: - Efficient grassroots organizations in urban neighborhoods - Social services to the urban poor - Appeals to small and medium business owners - Critiques of Western-style capitalism and secularism
The party advocated for a “Just Order” (Adil Düzen) that promised to combine Islamic ethics with economic development while reducing dependence on Western powers and institutions.
The Welfare Party’s watershed moment came in the 1994 municipal elections when it won mayoral races in several major cities, including Istanbul (where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became mayor) and the capital Ankara. This was followed by the party’s victory in the 1995 general elections, leading to Erbakan becoming prime minister in a coalition government in 1996.
The “February 28 Process” and the Reconfiguration of Islamic Politics
Erbakan’s brief tenure as prime minister (1996-1997) and its aftermath proved pivotal for Turkish political Islam. His government’s perceived challenges to the secular order including proposals for closer ties with Muslim countries, attempts to lift the headscarf ban, and appointments of religious conservatives to bureaucratic positions prompted a harsh reaction from the military and secular establishment.
On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council issued a series of ultimatums to roll back Islamic influence in public life, leading to Erbakan’s forced resignation in what became known as the “postmodern coup” or the “February 28 process.” The aftermath included:
Closure of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court in 1998
Political ban on Erbakan and other party leaders
Purges of religious conservatives from the military and civil service
Stricter enforcement of the headscarf ban in universities
Closure of many Imam Hatip middle schools
These events caused a strategic reassessment within the Islamic political movement. A reformist faction led by Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül concluded that direct challenges to Turkey’s secularist establishment were counterproductive and began advocating for a more moderate approach that emphasized democracy, human rights, and economic development rather than explicitly Islamic governance.
The Birth of the AKP: Reframing Islamic Politics
The split between traditionalists and reformists within the Islamic political movement became formalized with the establishment of two separate parties following the closure of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, the successor to the Welfare Party) in 2001:
The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), which maintained Erbakan’s National Outlook tradition
The Justice and Development Party (AKP), founded by Erdoğan and reformists, which described itself as a “conservative democratic” party comparable to European Christian Democratic parties
The AKP strategically avoided explicitly Islamic rhetoric, focusing instead on: - Democratic reforms and EU accession - Economic liberalization and growth - Opposition to military tutelage - Protection of religious freedom within a secular framework
This reframing proved electorally successful, allowing the AKP to attract support beyond the traditional Islamist base and win a decisive victory in the 2002 elections with 34.3% of the vote.
Part IV: The AKP Era: Conservative Democracy and the Evolution of Turkish Secularism (2002-Present)
Early AKP Period: Democratic Reform and Economic Growth
The early years of AKP rule (2002-2007) were characterized by significant democratic reforms aimed at EU accession, economic stabilization, and the gradual expansion of religious freedoms:
Constitutional amendments reducing military influence in politics
Legal reforms improving human rights protections
Economic policies that brought rapid growth and reduced inflation
Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Cyprus dispute
Incremental steps to ease restrictions on religious expression
During this period, the AKP operated within the constraints of Turkey’s established secular system while working to transform it. The government framed its policies not as Islamization but as democratization arguing that true secular democracy required freedom of religious expression, not its suppression.
Consolidation of Power and Growing Conservative Influence
The AKP’s second term (2007-2011) marked a more assertive phase. After surviving an attempted judicial closure of the party in 2008 and winning a constitutional referendum in 2010 that reformed the judiciary, the government began to implement more openly conservative policies:
Attempted lifting of the headscarf ban in universities (2008), which was initially struck down by the Constitutional Court as a violation of secularism
Eventual lifting of the headscarf ban in universities and later in public institutions (2013), with Erdoğan triumphantly declaring: “We have abolished an archaic provision which was against the spirit of the republic… Headscarf-wearing women are full members of the republic”
Expansion of religious education, including reopening Imam Hatip middle schools
Increased restrictions on alcohol sales and advertising
Growing religious rhetoric in public discourse
Appointment of religious conservatives to key bureaucratic positions
Increased budget and authority for the Directorate of Religious Affairs
These changes reflected both the government’s increased confidence after electoral successes and the gradual emergence of a new conservative elite in Turkish society educated professionals who maintained their religious identity rather than adopting secular lifestyles.
The Post-2013 Period: Authoritarian Turn and Religious Nationalism
The Gezi Park protests of 2013 and the subsequent breakdown of the AKP’s alliance with the Gülen movement (a religious community that had previously supported the party) marked another turning point. The government’s response included:
Increased emphasis on Ottoman-Islamic heritage and symbols
More explicit religious rhetoric and appeals to Islamic solidarity
Growing restrictions on opposition media and civil society
Promotion of “pious generations” as an educational goal
Expanded use of religious symbolism in state ceremonies
Erdoğan has openly spoken about his desire to “raise a religious generation” in Turkey, declaring that he aims to create “a generation that will work for the construction of a new civilization.” This vision explicitly intertwines Islamic identity with national purpose and represents a significant departure from Atatürk’s secularist vision.
After the failed coup attempt of July 2016, Erdoğan, now president with expanded powers following a 2017 constitutional referendum, embraced a form of religious nationalism that combined Turkish identity, Islamic values, and strong leadership. Symbolic actions during this period included:
The conversion of Hagia Sophia from a museum back to a mosque in 2020, which occurred just hours after Turkey’s highest court annulled the 1934 cabinet decree that had designated it a museum
The conversion of the ancient Chora Church to a mosque in the same period
The expansion of religious education requirements in schools
Increased funding for religious institutions and activities (the Diyanet’s budget increased from approximately TL 35.9 billion in 2023 to a staggering TL 91.8 billion in 2024 a 150% increase)
Greater prominence of religious ceremonies in state functions
Revival of Ottoman commemorations and symbols
The government’s approach to secularism evolved from early calls for greater religious freedom toward what some scholars describe as a “post-secular” model where religious values play a more prominent role in public policy and national identity.
Part V: Contemporary Dimensions of Religion and Politics in Turkey
Religion in the Constitutional Order
Turkey’s constitution still defines the state as secular, but the interpretation of this principle has shifted significantly. The AKP government has maintained formal secularism while redefining it to allow greater religious expression and influence in public life. This has created an ambiguous situation where:
State institutions remain officially secular
Religious education and services receive substantial state funding
Islamic symbolism is increasingly incorporated into national identity
The Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) has expanded its role and budget
This represents a move away from the strict French-style laïcité toward a model that some scholars compare to the “accommodationist” approach found in Germany or established church arrangements in some European countries.
Religious Education and the “Pious Generation”
Education has been a central battleground in Turkey’s religious politics. Under AKP governance:
Compulsory religious education has been expanded
Imam Hatip (religious) schools have proliferated dramatically: from 434 schools with 188,896 students (10.88% of all high school students) in 1996 to 1,693 schools with 514,630 students (10.34% of all high school students) in 2022
Religious content has increased in standard curriculum
Alternative theories to evolution have been introduced, with the removal of evolutionary theory from high school biology textbooks in 2017 as part of a new “values-based” curriculum
Ottoman history and Islamic civilization receive greater emphasis
The 2014 introduction of specialized İmam-Hatip “project schools” further diversified curricula toward religion and Arabic
Year | IH High School Students | IH Students % of All High Schools | # of IH High Schools |
1996 | 188,896 | 10.88% | 434 |
2004 | 84,898 | 2.37% | 442 |
2012 | 285,203 | 7.02% | – |
2022 | 514,630 | 10.34% | 1,693 |
The number of Imam Hatip schools dramatically declined after the 1997 “postmodern coup,” falling to just 2.37% of all high school students by 2004. The AKP government prioritized rebuilding this religious education infrastructure, returning the percentage to pre-1997 levels by 2022.
President Erdoğan has explicitly stated the goal of raising a “pious generation,” reflecting the belief that education should transmit religious and traditional values alongside modern knowledge. One Education Minister justified removing evolution from high school curriculum by stating it was “best left to be taught at the university level; it’s a theory that requires a critical mind.”
Women, Gender, and Family
Gender relations and family policy have been particularly contentious areas in Turkey’s religious politics:
Government promotion of traditional family structures and higher birth rates
Debates over women’s participation in the workforce
The headscarf issue as a symbol of religious freedom and identity
Concerns about the erosion of gender equality in law and practice
Conservative rhetoric about gender roles from political leaders
Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on preventing violence against women (2021)
These issues reflect deeper debates about the proper relationship between religious values and gender equality in a modernizing society.
Religious Minorities and Pluralism
Turkey’s religious landscape extends beyond Sunni Islam to include significant Alevi, Christian, and Jewish communities. The treatment of these minorities provides another lens for understanding Turkish secularism:
Ongoing Alevi demands for equal recognition of their religious identity and places of worship
The complex status of the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and other Christian communities
Limited progress on property restitution for minority religious foundations
Occasional interfaith initiatives alongside persistent discrimination
The concept of citizenship increasingly linked to Sunni Muslim identity
The treatment of religious minorities highlights the tensions between different conceptions of secularism: one that treats all religions equally versus one that privileges the majority faith while tolerating others.
The Diyanet: Religion Under State Control
The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) represents the distinctive Turkish approach to managing religion. Under AKP rule, the Diyanet has:
Seen its budget and staff expand dramatically: in 2023, the Diyanet’s budget was roughly TL 35.9 billion (about USD 1.2 billion), and the approved 2024 budget soared to TL 91.8 billion (USD ~3.2 billion) – a 150% increase
Extended its activities internationally to Turkish diaspora communities
Taken more conservative positions on religious and social issues
Become more closely aligned with government policies
Expanded beyond religious services into areas like family counseling and social media
This vast budget growth – now exceeding all but a handful of cabinet ministries – underlines the AKP’s prioritization of religious institutions. By comparison, the Diyanet’s funding in the early 2000s was only a few billion TL.
The Diyanet exemplifies the Turkish model where secularism means state control of religion rather than separation of religion and state. Ironically, the institution created by Atatürk to contain and regulate religion has become a powerful vehicle for expanding religious influence under the AKP.
Islamic Civil Society and Business
Beyond formal politics, Islamic influence has grown through civil society organizations and business networks:
Faith-based charitable organizations providing social services
Islamic business associations like MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association)
Religious foundations (vakıf) funding education and cultural activities
Islamic media outlets and publishing houses
Growing “halal” economy including Islamic banking, modest fashion, and halal tourism
Interest-free banking has grown into a sizable sector. Today Turkey has several major participation banks (Albaraka Türk, Kuveyt Türk, Vakıf Katılım, Türkiye Finans) alongside smaller institutions. Their combined assets have expanded rapidly, with funds collected by participation banks jumping from about TL 39 billion in 2011 to TL 322 billion in 2020. As a share of the banking system, Islamic banks held roughly 9% of total banking assets by 2023. This growth reflects political backing and customer demand among conservative Turks who prefer sharia-compatible finance.
Since the 1980s, a new class of conservative entrepreneurs has emerged. Dubbed “Anatolian Tigers” (Anadolu Kaplanları) or “Green Capital” (yesil sermaye), these are often Sunni businessmen from central provinces (Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Malatya) who broke into manufacturing and exporting. They built textile mills, furniture factories, and food industries, often reinvesting profits into pious charities and avoiding interest. Their provinces have steadily increased their share of national output and exports in recent decades.
These developments have created an infrastructure for Islamic influence that operates partly independently of state power. The rise of this “green capital” illustrates the AKP era’s interplay of faith and profit: banks, factories, and construction companies financed by religious conservatives thrive under an AKP that encourages both Islam and capitalism.
Part VI: International Dimensions and Comparisons
Turkish Secularism in Global Context
Turkey’s experience with secularism and religious politics can be compared to several other models:
French laïcité with its emphasis on removing religion from public life
American secularism based on separation of church and state with religious freedom
“Twin tolerations” model where democracy requires both religious actors accepting democratic principles and the state allowing religious expression
“Multiple secularities” framework recognizing different historical paths to secular governance
Turkey’s model of secularism has been distinctive. As one analyst summarized, “the main concern of Turkish secularists was freedom from religion, and almost never freedom of religion.” The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized that Turkish secularism “has a historical particularity” different from Western models. For instance, in a landmark 1991 ruling, it invalidated a parliamentary law easing headscarf restrictions, stating that permitting scarves would violate laiklik.
More recently, Turkey has moved away from strict French-style laïcité toward a model that some scholars compare to the “accommodationist” approach found in Germany or established church arrangements in some European countries. This shift represents what experts call “another moment in which the definitions of secularism and the relationship between government, religion, and the public sphere are all in flux.”
Turkey’s evolving approach demonstrates that secularism is not a fixed concept but a contested principle that develops differently according to historical, cultural, and political factors.
Religion in Turkish Foreign Policy
Religious identity has become increasingly significant in Turkey’s foreign relations:
Advocacy for Muslim causes in international forums
Support for Muslim minority communities worldwide
Religious diplomacy through the Diyanet and Turkish aid agencies
Complex relations with other Muslim-majority countries
Religious dimensions of regional conflicts
Tensions with Western allies over religious freedom issues
This represents a departure from the strictly secular foreign policy of earlier republican periods toward what some analysts call “neo-Ottomanism” a more multidimensional approach that incorporates Islamic solidarity alongside national interests.
Rather than a simple narrative of secularization or Islamization, Turkey represents a complex case of ongoing negotiation between these forces. The country’s experience raises important questions about the compatibility of democracy, secularism, and religious values that resonate far beyond its borders.
The future trajectory of religious politics in Turkey will depend on many factors: - The sustainability of the AKP’s conservative democratic model - Economic performance and social development, Generational changes in religious practice and identity - Regional dynamics and international influences ,The resilience of secular opposition
What seems certain is that the relationship between religion and politics will remain central to Turkey’s national identity and democratic development for the foreseeable future.
Sources:
Ipsos Global Advisor – Global Religion 2023 Report (May 2023) Ipsos
Ipsos Global Advisor – Religion 2023 Master Press Release (May 2023) Ipsos
Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) – İmam Hatip Lisesi İstatistikleri TÜİK Veri Portalı
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – 2023 Kurumsal Mali Durum ve Beklentiler Raporu stratejigelistirme.diyanet.gov.tr
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – 2024 Kurumsal Mali Durum ve Beklentiler Raporu stratejigelistirme.diyanet.gov.tr
BrainyQuote – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Quote: “I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea.” BrainyQuote
Goodreads – Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (quote collection) Goodreads
UNESCO – “Hagia Sophia: UNESCO deeply regrets the decision of the Turkish authorities…” (10 July 2020) UNESCO World Heritage Centre
NPR – “In Turkey, Schools Will Stop Teaching Evolution This Fall” (20 August 2017) NPR
Optimar Araştırma, “Gençlik ve Din: Türkiye Raporu 2019” (June 2019).https://optimar.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-Genclik-ve-Din-Raporu.pdf
Pew Research Center, “Religion in Turkey: A 2019 Global Attitudes Study” (December 2019).https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2019/12/19/religion-in-turkey/
1926-27 yıllarında Atatürk ile röportaj yapan Grace Ellison'ın 1928 yılında yayımlanan "Turkey Today" adlı kitabı
KONDA Research & Consultancy, “How Religious Are We? 10-Year Trends in Religious Orientation” (December 2018). https://konda.com.tr/en/comprehensive-reports
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (MEB), “2021–2022 Eğitim Yılı İmam Hatip Liseleri İstatistikleri” (September 2022).https://yigm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2022_istatistik/ihl_2021-2022.pdf
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (MEB), “2023–2024 Eğitim Yılı İmam Hatip Liseleri İstatistikleri” (September 2024).https://yigm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2024_istatistik/ihl_2023-2024.pdf
France: Loi du 9 décembre 1905 sur la séparation des Églises et de l’État.https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000319474/
Germany: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Artikel 140.https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_140.html
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Kemal Kirişci, “Turkey’s Evolution in the Middle East” (2023) – discusses use of religious soft powerhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/12/turkey-s-evolution-in-middle-east-pub-89402
Brookings Institution, Sinan Ülgen, “Between Isolate and Integrate: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Dilemma” (2021) – analyses Diyanet’s diplomatic rolehttps://www.brookings.edu/articles/between-isolate-and-integrate-turkeys-foreign-policy-dilemma/
Chatham House, “Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy” (2022) – includes a section on religious diplomacyhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/turkey-soft-powerstrategy
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